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Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye pay tithe of mint and 
anise and cumin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, 
MXGJPHQWPHUF\DQG IDLWK«<HEOLQGJXLGHVZKLFKVWUDLQDW WKHJQDWDQG
swallow a camel. 
        Matthew 23, 23-24 
 
 
 
I. SWALLOWING THE CAMEL: CIVIL UNION IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
A. Introduction 
More than thirty jurisdictions across the (western) world have, since Demark 
was the first to do so in 1989, created institutionalised means by which same-
sex couples can have their personal relationships registered with the state 
and governed by legal rules, analogous to those applicable to opposite-sex 
FRXSOHVWKURXJKWKHIDUROGHULQVWLWXWLRQWKDWZHFDOO³PDUULDJH´New Zealand, 
a state with a strong perception of itself as an egalitarian and socially 
                                            
1 This article was written while enjoying the facilities generously provided to me at the Faculty 
of Law, Victoria University of Wellington.  I am grateful both to the institution and to various 
individuals, including Tony Angelo, Bill Atkin and Dean McKnight, who commented on early 
drafts, and also to various others throughout New Zealand with whom I was able to discuss 
the issues in this article.  Expressions of opinion, and responsibility for any errors, remain 
mine alone. 
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progressive country, did so with its Civil Union Act 2004, which came into 
force on 26 April 2005, together with a plethora of Amendment Acts bringing 
civil union partners within the parameters of existing legislation.2  These Acts 
are 1HZ=HDODQG¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKH radical but still fairly recent shift in social 
attitudes towards gay and lesbian people, and same-sex couples, which has 
accorded us the values of human dignity and equality before the law.  But as 
we will see, New Zealand law tolerates rather than celebrates this new ideal 
of social justice.  With LGBT issues, New Zealand is a country that follows 
rather than leads. 
 
 
B. 3RVLWLRQLQJ1HZ=HDODQG¶V$SSURDFKWR&LYLO8QLRQ 
Though the categories cannot be precisely drawn, it is possible to distinguish 
three basic approaches to the creation of institutions for same-sex couples, 
which can be registered with the state.3 
 
1. Marriage 
A small but steadily increasing number of countries have opened up marriage 
itself to same-sex couples.  Legislatively or judicially this has happened in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Canada and the US states of 
Massachusetts and Connecticut.  South Africa is also a member of this group, 
though its judicially mandated legislation4 creates a marriage regime that is 
open to same-sex and opposite-sex couples without removing the existing 
marriage regime (governed by different legislation) that remains restricted to 
opposite-sex couples. 
                                            
2 See, for example, the Administration Amendment Act 2005, the Care of Children 
Amendment Act 2005, the Child Support Amendment Act 2005, the Deaths by Accident 
Compensation Amendment Act 2005, the Goods and Services Tax Amendment Act 2005, the 
Government Superannuation Fund Amendment Act 2005, the Trustee Amendment Act 2005 
and the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005. 
3 Different jurisdictions adopt a variety of names but for the purposes of this article the 
IROORZLQJWHUPLQRORJ\ZLOOEHXVHG³PDUULDJH´³FLYLOXQLRQ´DQG³GRPHVWLFSDUWQHUVKLS´, with 
the distinctions described in the text.  This language will not always accord with the 
terminology used in the home state of the institution: for example the Oregon institution for 
same-VH[FRXSOHVLVFDOOHGWKHUH³GRPHVWLFSDUWQHUVKLS´EXWLWVLQFLGHQWVFOHDUO\ORFDWHLW
ZLWKLQ³FLYLOXQLRQ´DVGHILQHGLQWKLVDUWLFOH  See the Oregon Family Fairness Act 2007, 
Oregon Laws ch 99. 
4 Civil Union Act 2006 (SA), following Fourie v Minister for Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 
(CC). 
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2. Civil Union 
Countries in this group have created an institution distinct from but equivalent 
to marriage, that is to say one with virtually the same consequences as that 
existing institution, including the rules for entry and exit.  To this group of 
jurisdictions belong the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, 
Finland, Sweden, Iceland, the Czech Republic, South Africa and the US 
states of New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon and Vermont.5  It is this model 
that has been adopted by New Zealand in its Civil Union Act 2004.  In what is 
(perhaps) a subgroup, we may also include here countries like Germany, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg and Slovenia, all of which to a rather greater extent 
than in the other countries in this group withhold some of the rights and 
obligations arising from marriage. 
 
3. Domestic Partnership 
Many jurisdictions, though wishing to confer marital rights and obligations on 
same-sex couples, have been unwilling to confer a marriage-like status on 
such couples, for fear that gay people might claim to be as good as non-gay 
people.  So they have allowed them (and usually also opposite-sex cohabiting 
couples in de facto relationships) to register their partnership with the state 
and acquire thereby some of the rights and obligations applicable to married 
couples.  The defining characteristic of this approach, making it fundamentally 
different from the previous two, is that either party may terminate the 
relationship without judicial or administrative process.  During its subsistence 
neither party loses their capacity to marry or enter into a civil union with 
another person, and usually their doing so will automatically terminate any 
existing domestic partnership.  The Australian states of Victoria and 
Tasmania, and the Australian Capital Territory have adopted this approach, 
as have Uruguay, Andorra, Belgium, France and Hungary, and the US states 
of California,6 Maine, Hawaii, Washington and the District of Columbia.  In 
truth the issue of same-sex relationships is tackled in these jurisdictions by 
                                            
5 The most detailed exposition of the position in the US may be found in I and S Curry-
6XPQHU³,VWKH8QLRQ&LYLO"6DPH-Sex Marriages, Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships and 
5HFLSURFDO%HQHILWVLQWKH86$´8WUHFKW/5 
6 Though illustrating the difficulties of classification,California allows easy escape from 
domestic partnership only if certain conditions are satisfied, otherwise a divorce process must 
be adopted: see Cal Fam Code § 299. 
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extending the law of de facto relationships rather than the law of marriage/civil 
union.  Except peripherally, this category will receive no further consideration 
in this article, because relationships of this nature are unlikely to give rise to 
difficult private international law issues: de facto relationships in the country of 
origin are likely, and properly, to be dealt with as de facto relationships in New 
Zealand.7 
 
4. 1HZ=HDODQG¶V3HFXOLDULWLHV 
New Zealand has therefore gone significantly further than some countries, 
and not quite so far as others, in equating the position of the two types of 
couple and ensuring that same-sex couples are treated with equal respect by 
the law.  There are nevertheless two aspects of New Zealand law that render 
its same-sex relationship regime to some extent unusual. 
 
First, unlike the civil partnership created by WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V Civil 
Partnership Act 2004, civil union in New Zealand is not an institution that is 
limited to same-sex couples: rather it is open to both opposite-sex couples 
and same-sex couples.8  In world terms, New Zealand is not alone in allowing 
opposite-sex couples access to a non-marital equivalent to marriage.  
However, though the Netherlands and South Africa both similarly allow 
opposite-sex couples to choose civil union instead of marriage, they also 
allow same-sex couples to choose marriage instead of civil union.  France, 
Belgium, some US states such as Hawaii and Maine9 and some Australian 
states open their regimes to both same-sex and opposite sex couples, but 
these are domestic partnership schemes which do not affect status.  New 
Zealand is therefore virtually alone of countries adopting a civil union 
                                            
7 Private international law issues do arise, however.  For a Scottish perspective, see J 
&DUUXWKHUV³'H)DFWR&RKDELWDWLRQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO3ULYDWH/DZ'LPHQVLRQ´
Edinburgh LR 51. 
8 Civil Union Act 2004, s 4(1).  Interestingly, the New Zealand Law Commission saw no 
justification for allowing opposite-sex couples access to civil union:  see Recognising Same-
Sex Relationships Study Paper No 4, 2000 at para 31.  The inclusion of opposite-sex couples 
is almost certainly the result of political imperative rather than legal logic.  McNamara opines 
WKDW³SROLWLFDO expediency suggested that wide support for the [Civil Union] Bill was likely to be 
achieved if the measure was perceived as about unmarried couples generally, rather than 
DERXWJD\DQGOHVELDQHTXDOLW\VSHFLILFDOO\´/0F1DPDUDHuman Rights Controversies: The 
Impact of Legal Form (Routledge Cavendish, 2007) at 140. 
9 In California, New Jersey and Washington opposite-sex couples who have attained the age 
of 62 may also access this alternative to marriage. 
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approach in giving choice to opposite-sex couples as to the legal form their 
status-creating relationship is to take, while at the same time withholding that 
choice from same-sex couples. 
 
Secondly, New Zealand has gone much further than most other 
countries in equating the position of registered couples (those who are 
married or in a civil union) with unregistered couples (typically referred to in 
1HZ =HDODQG DV ³GH IDFWR UHODWLRQVKLSV´).10  Though there are some 
differences (explored later), by and large the major personal consequences of 
marriage apply equally to de facto couples.  The rules for entry into 
marriage/civil union in New Zealand are now quite disproportionately complex 
in relation to the actual legal effects of achieving the status of marriage/civil 
union.  However, the importance of institutionalisation of relationships  -  
rendering them de iure as well as de facto, and creating a status  -  is not to 
be underplayed, as will be seen later. 
  
OthHUWKDQWKHVHWZRIDFWRUV1HZ=HDODQG¶V&LYLO8QLRQ$FWLVD
fairly typical example of legislation creating an institution for same-sex 
couples distinct from but equivalent to marriage.  Now, people from overseas 
travel to New Zealand.  Either as individuals or as couples people travel to 
New Zealand for business, for vacation or to settle.  Gay and lesbian people 
and same-sex couples do so no less frequently than others.  This means that 
the question is inevitable whether a relationship between a same-sex couple 
that has been registered abroad will be entitled to be recognised as such in 
New Zealand.11  $QGKHUH1HZ=HDODQG¶VSHFXOLDULW\LVVWDUN,t is the purpose 
of this article to examine the rules for recognition of overseas relationships 
contained in the Civil Union Act 2004.  As we will see, these rules are 
remarkably, suspiciously, narrow and so we will also examine whether it is 
possible to recognise overseas same-sex relationships outwith the provisions 
of that Act. 
 
                                            
10 See the Interpretation Act 1999, s 29A. 
11 The matter has already been raised LQWKH1HZ=HDODQGOLWHUDWXUHVHH-&DPSEHOO³1HZ
=HDODQG¶V&LYLO8QLRQ$FW1HZ&KDOOHQJHVIRU3ULYDWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´
VUW Law Rev 69. 
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Before doing so, however, it is as well to remind ourselves that civil union in 
New Zealand is not in every respect identical to marriage, even beyond the 
rules concerning gender mix.  The following section will attempt to identify the 
major areas of difference between these two distinct, but equivalent, 
institutions. 
 
 
C. Differences Between Marriage and Civil Union in New Zealand 
No jurisdiction that has created a civil union regime for same-sex couples has 
been able to apply its marriage rules identically to such couples, and New 
Zealand is no exception.  Just as the major marriage rules in New Zealand  
now concern entry into that institution, so too the major points of departure 
between marriage and civil union are located here. 
 
1. Rules for Entry 
Some of the differences are little more than terminological12 or reflect an 
updated or more contemporary situation.13  But some other differences are 
symbolically and substantively significant, and carry a distinct odour of 
reluctance in the acceptance of same-sex relationships.  For example, special 
words are laid down in the Marriage Act 1955 that must be used in the 
solemnisation of marriage,14 but an equivalent formulation was rejected for 
civil union.15  More substantively, marriages conducted where one of the 
parties is under sixteen are DVWRXQGLQJO\WRDQRXWVLGHU¶VH\HVnot invalid16 
                                            
12 Such as, for example the different ways of expressing the lower age limit  -  sixteen in both 
cases  -  ZLWKWKH0DUULDJH$FWVSURYLGLQJWKDW³QRPDUULDJHVKDOOEHVROHPQLVHGLI
HLWKHUSDUW\LVXQGHU´DQGWKH&LYLO8QLRQ$FWVSURYLGLQJWKDW³DSHUVRQ>XQGHU@
is prohibited from entering a civil union´ 
13 Court consent to unions involving a minor is to be given, for example, by a district court 
judge under s 18(2)(c)(i) of the 1955 Act and by a family court judge under s 19(4) of the 2004 
Act.  The 1955 rule for marriage is that parental consent is not needed if the parent is 
overseas (1955 Act, s 18(5)); 50 years later the difficulties of contacting persons overseas 
have almost evaporated and a rule to this effect, now unnecessary, does not appear in the 
2004 Act.  The penalties for a registrar or celebrant wilfully solemnising a marriage contrary to 
the 1955 Act is 5 years imprisonment or $600 fine (1955 Act, s 58), while the equivalent 
offence under the 2004 Act attracts a fine set at a more contemporarily appropriate $10,000 
(2004 Act, s 30). 
14 Marriage Act 1955, s 31(3). 
15 6HH$7UHQZLWK³8QGHUPLQLQJWKH6DQFWLW\RI&LYLO8QLRQV"´1=/- 
16 Marriage Act 1955, s 17(2).  This is likely to be a breach of international law, New Zealand 
being a signatory to the 1962 UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of 
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while civil unions in such circumstances (sensibly) are.17  Also, the parental 
consent provisions are more onerous for civil union than for marriage.  The 
Marriage Act 1955 requires that whenever either of the parties to the marriage 
is sixteen or seventeen, they require the consent of either one or both 
parents, depending upon whether the party is living with them and whether 
the parents are living together or apart.18  On the other hand, entering a civil 
union while either party is sixteen or seventeen requires the consent of ³HDFK
of >WKDWSDUW\¶V@ JXDUGLDQV´.19  The differences are threefold.  First and most 
obviously, more consents are needed for civil union since the marriage rules 
permitting consent of only one parent are QRWUHSOLFDWHG6HFRQGO\³JXDUGLDQ´
LVDUDWKHUEURDGHUFRQFHSWWKDQ³SDUHQW´$SHUVRQPD\RQO\HYHUKDYHWZR
parents, but may well have more than two guardians (though parents will 
nearly always be guardians).  Thirdly, the court may dispense entirely with 
parental consent to marriage if no parent can be found who is capable of 
consenting,20 but this provision is not replicated in the Civil Union Act.21  
These differences suggest a parliamentary belief that the decision to enter 
civil union is a more serious decision than the decision to marry, one that 
requires greater control by those with legal responsibility over the minor 
contemplating that significant move.  Given that the legal consequences of 
marriage and civil union are, by and large, the same it would seem to be the 
social consequences that are thought to be more serious: this is dangerously 
close to that article of faith of the American Right, that homosexuality is not a 
state of being but a ³lifestyle´ choice. 
 
Of even greater import is the difference in result if a required consent is 
not obtained.  When a person who is sixteen or seventeen marries without 
obtaining the necessary parental consent, the 1955 Act expressly preserves 
                                                                                                                             
Marriage and Registration of Marriage which, by art 2, requires an absolute minimum age to 
be set by law. 
17 Civil Union Act 2004, s 23(2)(a). 
18 Marriage Act 1955, s 18. 
19 Civil Union Act 2004, s 19(2). 
20 Marriage Act 1955, s 18(2)(c)(i). 
21 Though in both the court can give its consent in substitution for a parent or guardian who 
refuses consent: Marriage Act 1955, s 19; Civil Union Act 2004, s 20.  See Buckland v 
Buckland (1988) 5 NZFLR 598; Hill v Hill (1983) 2 NZFLR 30. 
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WKH PDUULDJH¶V YDOLGLW\,22 indicating that parental consent to marriage is a 
matter merely of form (and therefore, incidentally, for the lex loci 
celebrationis).  But when a person aged sixteen or seventeen enters a civil 
union without obtaining all of the necessary consents then that civil union is 
stated to be void ab initio.23  This suggests strongly that guardianship consent 
is more than a mere formality within civil union, a suggestion confirmed by the 
rule in section 24 of the 2004 Act that, unlike lack of consent, defects in 
³FRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHIRUPDOLWLHVRUSURFHGXUHVUHTXLUHGXQGHUWKLV$FW´ZLOOQRW
render the civil union void.  This has serious consequences for the capacity of 
New Zealanders to enter into civil unions overseas.  In the important Scottish 
decision of Bliersbach v McEwan24 the Court of Session held that, since lack 
of parental consent to marriage in Dutch law did not render void ab initio 
marriages there, a marriage in Scotland involving a Dutch minor who had not 
obtained parental consent would be valid and unchallengeable.  The question 
turned on the nature of the impediment.  If lack of parental consent were an 
impedimentum dirimens (or impediment irritant) then it would prevent the 
marriage coming into existence at all, making it null and void; if it were an 
impedimentum impeditivum (or impediment prohibitive) it would not render the 
marriage void but merely prohibit its celebration.  The former is governed by 
WKH ODZ RI WKH SDUW\¶V GRPLFLOH WKH ODWWHU E\ WKH ODZ RI WKH SODFHZKHUH WKH
marriage is celebrated.25  Lack of parental consent to marriage in New 
Zealand law is, it would seem clear, merely an impediment prohibitive 
because, explicitly, the marriage is not rendered void without such consent; 
but lack of guardianship consent, equally explicitly, does render a civil union 
void and so is likely to be regarded as an impediment irritant.26  It would follow 
that a New Zealand minor who did not have parental or guardianship consent 
could nevertheless validly marry in Scotland, because the necessity for 
consent would be a matter for Scots law, but would be unable to validly enter 
a civil union there, because the necessity for consent would be a matter for 
New Zealand law. 
                                            
22 Marriage Act 1955, s 18(7). 
23 Civil Union Act 2004, s 23(2). 
24 1959 SC 43. 
25 This is also the approach of English law (see Simonin v Mallac (1860) 2 Sw & Tr 67; Ogden 
v Ogden [1908] P 46) and of New Zealand law (Kawasaki v Kawasaki [1977] NZFLR 932). 
26 %XWWHUZRUWK¶VFamily Law in New Zealand (13th edn 2007) para 11.50, n 22. 
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There are other minor differences relating to the rules for entry.  Proxy 
marriages are permitted in some limited circumstances in New Zealand27 but 
QRW SUR[\ FLYLO XQLRQV ³VHUYLFH PDUULDJHV´ may be conducted overseas 
according to the formalities of New Zealand law28 but not civil unions.  Again, 
marriage is treated as a status to be encouraged, and civil union as a 
relationship to be tolerated. 
 
2. Consequences of Marriage and Civil Union 
There are few differences in the actual consequences of being married or in a 
civil union in New Zealand.  The presumption of paternity arising from the birth 
of a child to a married woman29 does not apply in the case of civil union, but 
when the pregnancy is a result of artificial human reproduction procedures (as 
it usually will be in the case of same-sex couples) the partner with whom the 
mother is in a civil (or de facto) union will be deemed to be the parent of the 
child.30  Adoption is an area of some uncertainty.  The Adoption Act 1955 
provides31 that an application to adopt a child may be made jointly by two 
SHRSOHRQO\LIWKH\DUH³VSRXVHV´7KHUHLVFRQIOLFWLQJDXWKRULW\Ds to whether 
this word is to be interpreted narrowly, to mean only parties to a valid 
marriage, or more broadly to include de facto and same-sex couples.32  In the 
most recent decision, In the Matter of C (Adoption)33 the Court held that the 
word ³VSRXVH´could be interpreted to LQFOXGH³WZRSHUVRQVLQDUHODWLRQVKLSLQ
WKHQDWXUHRIPDUULDJH´DQGSHUPLWWHGDQRSSRVLWH-sex couple who were in a 
de facto relationship to adopt a child of whom they were both the genetic 
parents.34  If civil union partners are held to be in a relationship in the nature 
                                            
27 Marriage Act 1955, s 34; Proxy Marriage Regulations 1958 (SR 1958/46). 
28 Ibid, s 44. 
29 Status of Children Act 1969,s 5. 
30 Ibid, s 18, as inserted by the Status of Children Act 2004, s 14. 
31 Adoption Act 1955, s 3(2). 
32 In Re an Adoption by Paul and Hauraki [1993] NZFLR 266 and In the Matter of J (Adoption) 
[1998] NZFLR 961 adoption by de facto couples was permitted on the basis that they came 
ZLWKLQDQH[WHQGHGPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUG³VSRXVH´EXWLQ In the Matter of R (Adoption) [1999] 
NZFLR 145 and Re D (Adoption) [2000] NZFLR 529 the court refused to apply that extended 
meaning and denied an adoption order to de facto couples. 
33 [2008] NZFLR 141. 
34 The child had been born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement. 
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RIPDUULDJH WKHQ WKH\PD\ZHOOEHKHOG WREH ³VSRXVHV´ IRU WKHSXUSRVHVRI
the Adoption Act 1955.35 
  
The criminal law makes a few distinctions between marriage and civil 
union.  For example, section 56 of the Marriage Act 1955 makes it a crime to 
deny or impugn the validity of a lawful marriage but no equivalent crime was 
created in the Civil Union Act 2004.  Once again, we see a reluctance to 
embrace civil union as a relationship whose social significance is as great as 
marriage.  The most important criminal law difference is that marriage will 
render lawful underage sexual activity36 but civil partnership does not.  Since 
the domestic age of marriage and the age for lawful sexual activity in New 
Zealand is the same, this rule primarily affects couples (validly) marrying 
abroad where the age of marriage is lower than the New Zealand age of 
lawful sexual activity.37  But sexual activity between couples who have 
entered a civil union in a country where the age of entry is lower than 16 will 
remain a criminal offence in New Zealand.  The thinking behind this failure to 
extend a marital benefit to civil union partners may well have been that 
overseas civil unions will not be recognised under the 2004 Act in any case if 
they inYROYHSDUWLHVEHORZ1HZ=HDODQG¶VDJH of lawful sexual activity but if, 
as will be argued later, there are other means than the 2004 Act of effecting 
recognition the failure to apply the marital exemption rule to same-sex 
registered couples results in a difference of treatment based on sexual 
orientation.  Differential ages for lawful sexual activity depending upon 
                                            
35 In support of this argument it may be pointed out that New Zealand law has not set its face 
against parenthood jointly vesting in a couple of the same-sex.  First, the female partner of a 
woman who became pregnant through artificial human reproduction procedures will be 
GHHPHGWREHWKHFKLOG¶VSDUHQWDORQJZLWKWKHPRWKHU6WDWXVRI&KLOGUHQ$FWVDV
inserted by the Status of Children Act 2004, s 14).  Secondly, s 17(2) of the Adoption Act 
1955, obliging the New Zealand courts to recognise Commonwealth adoption orders, will 
require recognition of parenthood embodied in, say, a Canadian adoption order granted to a 
same-sex married couple or a Scottish adoption order granted to a de facto couple of any 
gender mix (see Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, s 29).  It is now unsustainable 
for New Zealand to withhold adoption rights to same-VH[FRXSOHV³WKHKRUVHKDVDOUHDG\
EROWHG´LQWKHZRUGVRI0+HQDJKDQLQ³$GRSWLRQ7LPHIRU&KDQJHV´2006) 5 NZFLJ 131. 
36 Crimes Act 1961, s 134(4).  6HHIXUWKHU3YRQ'DGHOV]HQ³7KH$GRSWLRQ$FW-  The 
3UHVVLQJ1HHGIRU5HIRUP´1=)/5 
37 For an extreme example of the operation of the equivalent rule in England, see Mohamed v 
Knott [1969] QB 1 where a 26 year old Nigerian man was held to have committed no offence 
when he had sexual intercourse with his 13 year old wife, because the Nigerian marriage was 
recognised in England as valid. 
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whether it is homosexual or heterosexual are not easily justified and are 
usually based on homophobic stereotyping.38 
 
D. The Human Rights Environment in New Zealand 
Like courts in the UK,39 New Zealand courts are statutorily obliged to interpret 
legislation in a way that is consistent with human rights norms, as established 
in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.40  Section 19 of that Act provides 
WKDW³Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ LQ WKH +XPDQ 5LJKWV $FW ´  2QH RI WKH JURXQGV RI
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ OLVWHG LQ WKH  $FW LV ³VH[XDO RULHQWDWLRQ ZKLFK PHDQV D
heterosexual, homosexual, lesbLDQ RU ELVH[XDO RULHQWDWLRQ´.41  The New 
Zealand courts, however, have been far less proactive than their UK 
counterparts in seeking to advance a human rights agenda generally,42 seeing 
social policy issues (such as LGBT rights) as primarily a matter for Parliament 
rather than for them.43  The courts in neither the UK nor New Zealand are able 
to strike down legislation that is inconsistent with human rights norms or to 
change the meaning of statutes in order to ensure human rights consistency, 
but the British courts have proved themselves willing to strain the meaning of 
words and phrases far beyond the obvious, literal or intended.  New Zealand 
courts do not do so.  In Quilter v Attorney General Thomas J said that section 
6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights AcW ³GRHV QRW DXWKRULVH WKH FRXUWV WR
legislate.  Even if a meaning is theoretically possible, it must be rejected if it is 
                                            
38 The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has rejected as myth the argument that 
a homosexual orientation develops later than a heterosexual orientation, which the Austrian 
Government had put forward in a vain attempt to justify the differential ages for lawful sexual 
activity in Austria: see SL v Austria (2003) 37 EHRR 39. 
39 See the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 3. 
40 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6. 
41 Human Rights Act 1993, s 21(1)(m). 
42 6HH3%XWOHU³+XPDQ5LJKWVDQG3DUOLDPHQWDU\6RYHUHLJQW\LQ1HZ=HDODQG´
VUW L Rev 341. 
43 Perhaps this is inevitable, given the terms of s 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
which prohibits the courts from (i) holding any provision in any enactment to be impliedly 
repealed or revoked or to be in any way invalid or ineffective, or (ii) declining to apply any 
provision.  This iVDFFRUGLQJWR35LVKZRUWK³5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH%LOORI5LJKWV$IWHUQuilter´
1=/DZ5HYDW³RXUZD\RIVD\LQJWKDWWKH%LOORI5LJKWVZDVQRWLQWHQGHGWR
augur changes in the allocation of responsibility (as between Parliament and the courts) for 
GHFLGLQJWKHDFFHSWDELOLW\RIODZV´6HHDOVR&*HLULQJHU³7KH'HDG+DQGRIWKH%LOORI
Rights?  Is the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 a Substantive Legal Constraint on 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V3RZHUWR/HJLVODWH"´2WDJR/5HYWKHDQVZHU VKHJLYHVLV³QR´). 
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FOHDUO\FRQWUDU\ WRZKDW3DUOLDPHQW LQWHQGHG´44  In this case an attempt had 
been made to persuade the New Zealand Court of Appeal to extend the 
traditional understanding of marriage in the Marriage Act 1955 to include 
same-sex couples, on the ground that the interpretative obligation in section 6 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 required an interpretation of the 
1955 Act that did not differentiate between same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples.  The attempt failed.45  The majority of the Court held that restricting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples did not amount to discrimination as New 
Zealand law understood that concept.  Different treatment becomes 
discrimination only if it entails disadvantage, burden or detriment to the person 
treated differently.  The conclusion that restricting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples does not entail disadvantage for same-sex couples is, at best, 
counter-intuitive, but even Thomas J, the dissentient who held that there was 
discrimination, agreed with his brethren that the courts could not, through the 
process of interpretation, remove that discrimination. 
 
This is a far more limited view of the judicial function in relation to 
human rights compatibility than that adopted by the UK courts.  The House of 
Lords, for example, held in Ghaidan v Mendoza46 WKDW WKH SKUDVH ³OLYLQJ
WRJHWKHUDVKXVEDQGDQGZLIH´ZDV UHTXLUHGE\ WKH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FW
(UK) to be interpreted to include same-sex couples, which was achieved by 
UHDGLQJLWDVLILWKDGVDLG³OLYLQJWRJHWKHUas if they were KXVEDQGDQGZLIH´47  
Lord Nicholls, adopting an approach directly contrary to that suggested by 
Thomas J in Quilter, said that the courts could, if this were necessary to bring 
WKH OHJLVODWLRQ LQWR OLQH ZLWK WKH +XPDQ 5LJKWV $FW  ³GHSDUW IURP WKH
XQDPELJXRXV PHDQLQJ WKH OHJLVODWLRQ ZRXOG RWKHUZLVH KDYH´ DQG LQGHHG
³GHSDUWIURPWKHLQWHQWLRQRIWKH3DUOLDPHQWZKLFKHQDFWHGWKHOHJLVODWLRQ´48 
 
                                            
44 [1998] 1 NZLR 523 at 542. 
45 See Rishworth, n 43 DERYH$%XWOHU³6DPH-6H[0DUULDJHDQG'LVFULPLQDWLRQ´
NZLJ 229. 
46 [2004] 3 All ER 411. 
47 That the Human Rights Act was crucial to this holding is shown by the fact that less than 
five years earlier the same Court had held precisely the reverse on exactly the same issue: 
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association [2001] 1 AC 27 
48 Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 3 All ER 411 at para 30. 
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It follows that there is far less scope in the New Zealand courts than 
there would be in the UK courts to run an argument based simply on different 
treatment, even when that treatment leads to detriment.49  The deference that 
New Zealand judges show to the New Zealand Parliament means that they 
are likely to leave social and political controversies with legal dimensions to 
the legislature.50  The jurisprudence on such issues from even more activist 
courts like the Constitutional Court of South Africa, or the Supreme Court of 
Canada (where such activism is exercised in the context of a constitutional 
environment that places such issues clearly within the realm of the judiciary) 
is of only very limited assistance in New Zealand.51  It would seem that there 
is little chance of the New Zealand courts holding that the non-discrimination 
provisions in the Bill of Rights require that marriage as opposed to civil union 
be opened to same-sex couples.52  But there is no doubt that the environment 
surrounding LGBT issues is very different, and far more supportive (socially, 
politically and legally), today than it was when Quilter was decided.  Perhaps 
the claimants in Quilter asked for too much (or did so too early).  Claims by 
gay and lesbian people and same-sex couples for access to individual rights, 
rather than the whole gamut of family rights and obligations flowing from 
marriage, based on undeniably disadvantageous treatment, have been far 
more difficult for courts around the (western) world to resist53 and the New 
Zealand courts may well feel able to interpret individual statutes governing the 
rights and obligations of marriage/civil union in a way that does not obviously 
disadvantage same-sex couples.  The question will hardly arise today in the 
                                            
49 M Henaghan has indeed suggested that the issue of discrimination does not arise if the 
ZRUGVRIDVWDWXWHDUHFOHDU³6DPH-6H[0DUULDJHVLQWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDO´1=/- 
50 So Gault J in Quilter states that the limitation of marriage to opposite-VH[FRXSOHV³VKRXOG
be ruled unjustifiable only by thHOHJLVODWXUHEHFDXVHRIWKHVRFLDOSROLF\FRQVLGHUDWLRQV´
[1998] 1 NZLR at 527. 
51 6HHWKHHQJDJLQJO\ZULWWHQSLHFHE\-$OODQ³7XUQLQJ&ODUN.HQWLQWR6XSHUPDQ7KH1HZ
=HDODQG%LOORI5LJKWV$FW´2WDJR/5HY$QGIRUDFRPSDUDWLYH
exDPLQDWLRQRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWH[WVHH*/LQGHOO³&RQVWLWXWLRQDO,VVXHV6XUURXQGLQJ
Same-6H[0DUULDJH$&RPSDUDWLYH6XUYH\RI1RUWK$PHULFDDQG$XVWUDODVLD´
Sydney L Rev 27. 
52 They are much more likely to say, as the English Court said in Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2007] 
1 FLR 296 that, since the legal position of civil union is virtually the same as marriage, there is 
no actual detrimental treatment felt by couples excluded from marriage but for whom civil 
union is open. 
53 6HH.1RUULH³&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&KDOOHQJHVWR6H[XDO2ULHQWDWLRQ'LVFULPLQDWLRQ´>@
ICLQ 755. 
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domestic context, but it remains live, and controversial, when dealing with gay 
and lesbian people, and same-sex couples, from overseas. 
 
 
,,675$,1,1*$77+(*1$73$5/,$0(17¶658/(6)25
RECOGNISING OVERSEAS CIVIL UNIONS 
 
A. The Normal Marriage Rules 
New Zealand follows fairly closely the English rules on the recognition of 
overseas marriages.54  It draws a distinction between matters of formal validity 
of marriage and matters of essential validity.  Formal validity, which concerns 
the process by which the relationship is legally created, is governed by the lex 
loci celebrationis, that is to say the domestic law of the place where the 
marriage is celebrated.55  Essential validity, on the other hand, concerns 
whether the parties are entitled or able to enter the relationship and includes 
matters of age, forbidden degrees of relationship and mental capacity to 
consent.  These are all, by and large, status-based issues and as such private 
international law doctrine requires that they are governed by the ante-nuptial 
domicile of each party.56 
 
The end result is a double test and, generally speaking, New Zealand 
law will recognise as valid any overseas marriage where (i) the local 
requirements of form were satisfied and (ii) the law of WKH SDUWLHV¶ GRPLFLOH
granted them capacity to enter into the marriage with each other.  The fact 
that New Zealand domestic law would not grant such capacity, or has different 
formalities, is irrelevant WR WKH TXHVWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU 1HZ =HDODQG¶V SULYDWH
international law allows recognition of the marriage.57 
 
These rules are designed to allow New Zealand law to recognise and 
give effect to marriages that could not have been contracted in New Zealand, 
                                            
54 See %XWWHUZRUWK¶VFamily Law in New Zealand (13th edn 2007) at para 11.52, which is 
explicitly (n 1) based on +DOVEXU\¶V/DZVRI(QJODQG (4th edn). 
55 See Patel v Patel (1982) 1 NZFLR 413. 
56 See %XWWHUZRUWK¶VFamily Law in New Zealand at para 11.08, and Hassan v Hassan [1978] 
1 NZFLR 385, which proceeds on this basis. 
57 This is subject only to a public policy exception, as discussed below. 
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as is seen most obviously with polygamous marriages.  The English courts 
(and the New Zealand courts too)58 originally refused to give any recognition 
to polygamous or potentially polygamous marriages that were otherwise valid 
according to the rules described above59 but this was never applied absolutely 
and as the years went by polygamous unions were recognised for more and 
more marital purposes.60  The Family Proceedings Act 1980 now defines 
³PDUULDJH´ LQ V  WR LQFOXGH IRUHLJQ SRO\JDPRXV PDUULDJHV DQG VR WKH 1HZ
Zealand courts may now hear actions for divorce brought by polygamously 
married parties, the very remedy that had been denied in Hyde v Hyde. 
 
B. Special Rules for Civil Union 
By 2004, when both the UK and the New Zealand Parliaments were enacting 
their civil union legislation, over twenty jurisdictions in the world had already 
done so, and it is a noticeable feature in the legislation of both countries that 
explicit rules for the recognition of overseas equivalents were included.  
However, in neither the British nor the New Zealand Act was the common law 
marriage rule simply put into statutory form and applied to civil union.  This 
was considered inappropriate since WKHPDMRULW\RIWKHZRUOG¶VMXULVGLFWLRQVdid 
not make any provision for same-sex couples and those countries that did had 
adopted a diversity of means for doing so.61  So special rules for the 
                                            
58 6HH%XWWHUZRUWK¶VFamily Law in New Zealand (13th edn 2007) at paras 11.98-11.103; 
Mong Kuen Wong v May Wong [1948] NZLR 348. 
59 Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 1 P&D 130. 
60 See Sinha Peerage Case /RUGV¶-RXUQDO>@$OO(5QRWHDQG
Bamgbose v Daniel [1955] AC 107 where marriages were recognised for the purposes of 
protecting the legitimacy of children in succession claims; Baindail v Baindail [1946] P 122, 
where a polygamous marriage was recognised to the extent that it created an incapacity to 
contract a further marriage; Mawji v R [1957] AC 126 (spousal exemption from criminal 
liability); Re Sehota [1978] 1 WLR 1506 (spousal claim for succession); Nabi v Heaton [1983] 
1 WLR 626 (income tax relief on maintenance paid to second wife while first marriage 
subsisted).  One of the few New Zealand cases dealing with polygamous unions is Hassan v 
Hassan [1978] 1 NZFLR 385 where Somers J (somewhat bemusingly) held that while the 
court could not make a declaration as to the validity of a polygamous marriage it could 
nevertheless make a declaration determining status, even when that involved assessing 
whether any such marriage had been dissolved. 
61 These reasons, commonly given by governments to justify different recognition rules for 
marriage and civil unions should not, perhaps, go unchDOOHQJHG7KHFRQFHSWRI³PDUULDJH´LV
not so universally understood as is alleged.  The world has child marriages, forced marriages, 
multiple party marriages, marriages from which escape is impossible, difficult, or easy at the 
hands of one, marriages between equals, or between dominant and subservient genders, 
marriages with primary and secondary wives, marriages that are religious sacraments and 
marriages that are entirely civil and secular institutions.  The diversity of opposite-sex 
relationships across the world is in truth no less than the diversity of same-sex relationships. 
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recognition of overseas unions that are not (opposite-sex) marriage were 
created in both Acts.  The UK legislation has detailed and complex rules for 
recognition of overseas same-sex relatationships but is, at the end of day, 
generous and expansive.62  1HZ=HDODQG¶V&LYLO8QLRQ$FW, on the other 
hand, provides a far simpler set of rules but the effect is restrictive and, it 
might even be said, insular and mean-spirited. 
 
1. The Recognition Rule in the United Kingdom 
The approach in the UK has been to specify in a schedule to the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 those jurisdictions that have introduced schemes 
sufficiently similar to that created by the 2004 Act that their same-sex 
registered relationships, whatever called, will be eligible for recognition in the 
United Kingdom as civil partnership.63  In addition, even if a particular 
relationship was not created in one of the jurisdictions specified in Schedule 
20, it will nevertheless be eligible for recognition as a civil partnership so long 
as it satisfies certain minimal requirements:64 this allows individual 
relationships to be immediately eligible for recognition when created in 
countries that have introduced civil unions  after 2004, without waiting for 
Parliament to update Schedule 20.  If eligible for recognition, the actual 
relationship will indeed be recognised if it is both formally and essentially valid 
by the law of the place of its creation.  The one limitation is that the 
relationship must be between parties of the same sex.65  So a New Zealand 
civil union would be eligible to be recognised in the United Kingdom as a civil 
partnership66 only if it involves a same-sex couple; that foul incubus on the 
New Zealand legislation, the opposite-sex civil union, would not be so 
eligible.67  There is also the qualification that whatever form the relationship 
takes in the creating jurisdiction, in the United Kingdom it will be treated as a 
                                            
62 For detailed discussion, see K 1RUULH³5HFRJQLWLRQRI)RUHLJQ5HODWLRQVKLSV8QGHUWKH&LYLO
3DUWQHUVKLS$FW´-RXUQDORI3ULYDWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ 
63 Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK), sched 20, as amended by the Civil Partnership Act 
(Overseas Relationships) Order 2005 (SI 2005 No.3135). 
64 Ibid, s 214: the relationship must be of indeterminate duration, it must result in the parties 
being treated as a couple, and it must not be permitted if either is already married or in a 
relationship of that kind. 
65 Ibid, s 216. 
66 New Zealand was added to schedule 20 in SI 2005 No 3135. 
67 I have previously argued (n 62 above) that British courts would either treat such a civil 
union as a marriage, or would simply give effect to its consequences in any case. 
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civil partnership whenever it involves a couple of the same sex.  So two 
women who married each other in Canada had their marriage treated as a 
civil partnership (rather than as a marriage) in the UK.68   Notwithstanding this 
OLPLWDWLRQ DQG TXDOLILFDWLRQ WKH 8.¶V DSSURDFK is a particularly generous 
recognition scheme and it explicitly envisages not only the recognition of 
overseas marriage and civil union regimes but also domestic partnership 
schemes.69  The common feature of the overseas regimes eligible for 
recognition under the UK Act is that they are all based on registration of the 
relationship with the state.70  A de facto couple in New Zealand, therefore, 
would not, but a same-sex civil union couple would, be treated as civilly 
empartnered in the UK  -  notwithstanding that New Zealand domestic law 
treats the two couples substantially similarly. 
 
2. The Recognition Rule in New Zealand¶V&LYLO8QLRQ$FW 
There is no explicit recognition rule in the Civil Union Act 2004 beyond the 
listing of specified jurisdictions.  But a necessary implication is that the 
individual relationship that is sought to be recognised must have been validly 
created in one of the specified jurisdictions, though how that validity is to be 
tested  -  by which legal system  -  is left entirely open to speculation.  The 
approach that the New Zealand courts are most likely to take is that validity 
will be determined by the law of the country where the relationship was 
created (effectively, the UK rule) though there may well be scope for the 
DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKDW FRXQWU\¶V SULYDWH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ UXOHV VR WKDW IRU
example, the question of capacity to enter a civil union is referred by the law 
of the place of creation to WKHSDUW\¶VDQWH-nuptial domicile. 
 
A far more serious problem, however, with the Civil Union Act 2004 is 
that the list of countries from which overseas relationships might be 
                                            
68 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022, [2007] 1 FLR 296. 
69 -6FKHUSH³/HJDO5HFRJQLWLRQRI)RUHLJQ)RUPDOLVHG6DPH-6H[5HODWLRQVKLSVLQWKH8.´
(2007) Int Fam LJ 196, argues that it is unduly generous to include schemes such as the 
French Pacs that permit easy unilateral escape, but this is no different from the recognition of 
marriages from some Muslim countries which men can escape from by the non-judicial 
process of talaq.  In both cases, moving to England means that the relationship hardens and 
judicial termination is the only way to bring it to an end before death. 
70 &LYLO3DUWQHUVKLS$FW8.VEGHILQLWLRQRI³RYHUVHDVUHODWLRQVKLS´  This is 
what allows domestic partnership schemes, such as the French Pacs, to be recognised. 
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recognised is far shorter in New Zealand than in the UK.  Exclusions from the 
list are mandatory, but inclusion in the list is discretionary.  And the discretion 
lies not with the courts but with the Governor-General, who acts on the advice 
of the Minister of Justice in this matter.  The Governor-General has not been 
generous in the exercise of his discretion, and most RIWKHZRUOG¶Vsame-sex 
relationship schemes, even those that are not prohibited, are not recognised 
in New Zealand.  As of March 2009, the Minister of Justice has no intention of 
advising greater generosity.71 
 
The crucial provision is section 5 of the Civil Union Act 2004 which 
provides as follows: 
 
In any other enactment, unless the context otherwise requires, a reference to 
a civil union refers to ± 
(a) a civil union entered into under and in accordance with this Act; 
and 
(b) a relationship that is entered into overseas and ± 
(i) is of a type identified by regulations made under s 35(1)(a) as 
being a type of relationship that is recognised in New Zealand 
as a civil union; and  
(ii) is between 2 people who are at least 18 years old or, if either 
party is younger than 18, was entered into with the consent 
RIWKDWSDUW\¶VJXDUGLDQV. 
 
7KLVHIIHFWLYHO\ LVDGHILQLWLRQVHFWLRQIRUWKHSKUDVH³FLYLOXQLRQ´DVLW
appears in all New Zealand legislation other than the Civil Union Act itself.  
Whenever that phrase occurs in New Zealand legislation it is limited to civil 
unions created in New Zealand or in jurisdictions specified in the regulations 
made under section 35.  Civil XQLRQVHQWHUHGLQWRDQ\ZKHUHHOVHDUHQRW³FLYLO
XQLRQV´ IRU WKH SXUSRVHV RI 1HZ =HDODQG OHJLVODWLRQ  Section 35(1)(a) 
authorises the Governor-General to make regulations for the purpose of 
³SUHVFULELQJ W\SHV RI RYHUVHDV UHODWLRQVKLSV WKDW DUH UHFRJQLVHG in New 
=HDODQGDVFLYLOXQLRQV´but section 35(2) provides, without exception, that 
                                            
71 Personal communication to the author from the Hon Simon Power, Minister of Justice, 4 
March 2009. 
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1RUHJXODWLRQVXQGHUVXEVHFWLRQD«PD\EHPDGHXQOHVVWKH0LQLVWHURI
Justice is satisfied that that type of overseas relationship is established or 
recognised under the law of another country or jurisdiction, and that the law of 
that country or jurisdiction: 
(a) does not permit or recognise the relationship unless both parties to 
it are at least 16 years old; and 
(b) does not permit or recognise the relationship if the parties are 
related as 
(i) parent and child; or 
(ii) siblings or half-siblings; or 
(iii) grandparent and grandchild; and 
(c) requires that the parties explicitly consent to entering into the 
relationship; and 
(d) provides that the relationship ends only on the death of a party or 
by a judicial or other process that would be recognised by the 
courts of New Zealand as a dissolution; and 
(e) requires that, during the relationship, the parties may not enter into 
that sort of relationship with anyone else, and may not marry 
anyone else. 
 
These rules prohibit the listing of any country that adopts a different 
rule from that in domestic New Zealand law on a number of core issues like 
age and consent, and in addition section 35(2)(d) prohibits the listing of any 
domestic partnership schemes since these can be escaped from without 
³MXGLFLDO RU RWKHU SURFHVV´  The aim is clearly to ensure that New Zealand 
courts are not forced to recognise overseas relationships that could not be 
entered into in New Zealand, but the central flaw in these provisions is that 
they go very much further than is necessary to achieve that aim.  The focus of 
enquiry is on the jurisdiction from which the relationship emanates and not the 
relationship itself, with the result that relationships that themselves satisfy 
every rule of domestic New Zealand law will not be recognised if the legal 
system under which they were created also permits other relationships that 
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would contravene domestic New Zealand law.72  In pursuit of the power under 
section 35(1), and abiding by the limitations in section 35(2), the Governor-
General made the Civil Unions (Recognised Overseas Relationships) 
Regulations 2005,73 which specifies types of relationship from five different 
jurisdictions: registered partnerships from Finland, life partnerships from 
Germany, civil partnerships from the United Kingdom, ³domestic partnerships´ 
from New Jersey, USA, and civil unions from Vermont USA, the assessment 
having been made that these jurisdictions all satisfy the criteria in section 
35(2).74 
 
This suspiciously limited range of overseas relationships is narrowed 
yet further by section 5(b)(ii), which requires parental consent before a civil 
union involving a minor is recognised.  This has the potential to cause some 
awkwardness for civil union partners from Germany and Finland which 
SURYLGHV IRU FRXUW FRQVHQW UDWKHU WKDQ IRU JXDUGLDQV¶ FRQVHQW,75 and for civil 
partners from Scotland whose marriage/civil partnership law76 eschews the 
ZKROHFRQFHSWRIDQ\RQH¶VFRQVHQWRWKHUWKDQWKHSDUWLHV¶It would seem that 
valid civil unions from these countries will be recognised in New Zealand, 
because they are listed in the 2005 Regulations, but that while either party 
                                            
72 Just how restrictive these rules are becomes clear when we realise that New =HDODQG¶V
own domestic marriage law could not be recognised since it would not satisfy s 35(2)(a): see 
n 16 above and text thereat. 
73 SR 2005/125. 
74 This assessment is not unchallengeable, at least in relation to the so-called UK civil 
partnership.  There LVQRH[SUHVVUHTXLUHPHQWLQWKDWFRXQWU\¶V&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLS$FWWKDW
the parties explicitly consent to entering into the relationship (in New Zealand it is explicitly 
provided that a civil union is void ab initio if either party did not consent: Family Proceedings 
Act 1980, s 31(1)(a)(ii)), and though it is possible to imply that consent from the requirement 
that the parties sign the registration certificate (s 2, in relation to England and Wales, s 85 in 
relation to Scotland) it may be doubted whether the English rule (which Scots lawyers read 
with bemusement) that a civil partnership registered without valid consent is not void but 
merely voidable (2004 Act, s 50(1)(a), replicating the rule for marriage in the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 (Eng), s 12(c)) can truly satisfy the New Zealand requirement in s 35(2)(c).  
Quaere: are the 2005 Regulations, for this reason, ultra vires and void in so far as they relate 
to English civil partnerships? 
75 Indeed it would cause awkwardness if the recognition of New Zealand civil unions were 
subject to the same rule.  Imagine there are two New Zealands, New Zealand North and New 
Zealand South, whose laws are identical in every respect.   A civil union couple who 
registered their relationship in one with court consent would not have that relationship 
recognised in the other, until the parties were both 18. 
76 6FRWODQG¶VFLYLOSDUWQHUVKLSUHJLPHLVFRQWDLQHGLQ3DUWRIWKH&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLS$FW 
(UK)DQGLVGLIIHUHQWIURP(QJODQG¶VUHJLPHFRQWDLQHGLQ3DUWVLQce the separate parts 
DLPWRUHSOLFDWHHDFKMXULVGLFWLRQ¶VVHSDUDWHPDUULDJHUXOHV(QJOLVKODZUHTXLUHVSDUHQWDO
FRQVHQWWRPLQRUV¶PDUULDJHEXW6FRWVODZKDVQRWGRQHVRVLQFHWKHth Century. 
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remains under eighteen, their recognised relationship will not be given effect 
because they will not FRPHZLWKLQ WKHGHILQLWLRQRI ³FLYLO XQLRQ´ IRUDQy New 
Zealand statutory purpose. 
 
Conflating the recognition provision in section 35 with the definition 
provision in section 5 has the effect of excluding (by not including) civil unions 
from all countries with civil union regimes other than New Zealand itself, the 
United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, New Jersey and Vermont.  The section 5 
GHILQLWLRQ LVKRZHYHUH[SOLFLWO\VWDWHGWRDSSO\³XQOHVVWKHFRQWH[WRWKHUZLVH
UHTXLUHV´,WZLOOEHWKHPDMRUWhrust of the rest of this article that the context 
will very frequently require otherwise and that civil unions from other countries 
cannot be ignored. 
 
C. Effect of the New Zealand Recognition Rule 
If we take the New Zealand legislation at its face value, couples who register 
their relationship in Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Hungary, South Africa, Canada, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, or anywhere else that has created an institutionalised 
means for same-sex couples to access the rights and obligations available to 
opposite-sex couples through marriage will not have these relationships 
treated as civil unions in New Zealand, notwithstanding that New Zealand 
domestic law creates just such a regime for its own citizens.  So what then 
would be the status of these couples when they come to New Zealand? 
 
At the very least, they are likely to be treated as de facto couples, 
which will give them access to most of the rights and responsibilities of 
PDUULDJHFLYLOXQLRQGXHWR1HZ=HDODQG¶VXQXVXDOO\expansive rules relating 
to de facto relationships.  But this is by no means sufficient entirely to 
ameliorate the position of same-sex couples from Denmark, Canada, South 
Africa, etc, for at least five reasons.  First and most obviously, it is rather 
demeaning for a same-sex couple to be told that their relationship no longer 
exists in law from the moment they arrive at Auckland International Airport.  
Now, one simply has to accept this when same-sex couples travel to countries 
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that have deliberately set their face against same-sex relationship recognition 
in any form, but it is inexplicable in relation to a country like New Zealand 
which obviously has little difficulty with the concept of civil union, or with 
same-sex relationships, in its own domestic law.  Secondly and more 
substantively, de facto couples are required to prove the nature of their 
personal relationship before they can access individual rights and 
responsibilities, and this will usually involve a judicial or administrative 
examination of the intimate minutiae of their private lives.77  With married 
couples and civil union partners, on the other hand, if there is doubt as to their 
relationship the focus of enquiry will be on the validity of the marriage/civil 
union and not the nature of their relationship.78  Doubtless the production of a 
foreign civil union certificate will go a long way to establish the nature of the 
relationship between the parties, but there is something ineluctably artificial  -  
even preposterous  -  LQXVLQJ WKH UHJLVWUDWLRQRIRQH¶V UHODWLRQVKLS WRSURYH
that one is in an unregistered relationship.  Thirdly, it is not true to say, even in 
New Zealand, that de facto couples are treated by the law in exactly the same 
way as married/civilly united couples.  The right to claim a division of 
relationship property at the end of a relationship of short duration79 is dealt 
with differently between married/civilly united couples and de facto couples;80 
married/civilly united couples can make such a claim from the age of sixteen, 
but de facto relationships are defined to commence only when both parties 
are eighteen;81 the presumption of paternity that flows from marriage82 does 
                                            
77 See, for example, the list of factors that the Court takes into account in determining whether 
a couple are a de facto couple for the purposes of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, 
contained in s 2D(2), including the sexual relations between the parties and the performance 
of household duties.  If in dispute as to the nature of the relationship these factors are 
examined in excruciating detail: see for example RRB v GF 25 June 2008 (Family Court).  
And in RPD v FNM >@1=)/5-XGJH0XUILWWVWDWHGDWSDUDWKDW³WKHTXDOLW\RIWKH
VH[XDOUHODWLRQVKLS´ as well as its existence was a matter of legitimate concern to the court. It 
is, surely, outrageous that foreign gay people are required to have this assessed by judges 
while foreign straight people areQ¶W 
78 This was one of the reasons stated by the New Zealand Law Commission for rejecting, 
within the context of domestic law, the option of dealing with same-sex couples through the 
law of de facto relationships: see n 8 above at para 19. 
79 Basically, one that lasted less than three years: Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2E. 
80 For a discussion of the differences, see BD Inglis New Zealand Family Law in the Twenty 
First Century, Thomson/Brookers (2007) at pp 1104-1112. 
81 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2D.  Couples younger than eighteen would appear to 
be de facto de facto couples but not de iure de facto couples.  New Zealand legislation begins 
to lose its grip on reality when, bearing in mind that a de facto couple are not a de facto 
couple for this purpose while either party is under 18, it nevertheless requires parental 
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not apply to de facto couples; the Family Court may make orders as to settled 
property between marriage/civil union partners but not between de facto 
partners;83 wills are revoked on entering a marriage/civil union but not a de 
facto relationship;84 and the parties to a marriage/civil union but not a de facto 
relationship have an enforceable obligation to support each other during the 
subsistence of the relationship85.  Fourthly, treating overseas civil union 
partners as de facto couples is to treat them as free to marry or enter a civil 
union without first obtaining the legal termination of their existing relationship: 
this will create far greater legal complexities (which will involve not only the 
partners themselves but also third parties like creditors and even the state) 
than recognising the reality that these couples are already in lawful unions.  
And fifthly, it runs the risk of discriminating against individuals and couples on 
the basis of their sexual orientation, which will often be contrary to the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights, and nearly always contrary to basic fairness.  In sum, it 
is bad social and legal policy to treat foreign same-sex registered 
relationships as de facto relationships.   
 
The questions that need to be explored are (i) whether these reasons 
are sufficient to allow the New Zealand courts to expand the narrow definition 
RI ³FLYLO XQLRQ´ LQ Vection 5 of the 2004 Act and (ii) if so, how is this to be 
done? 
 
 
III. SWALLOWING THE GNAT 
 
A. Introduction 
RHIHUHQFHV LQ 1HZ =HDODQG OHJLVODWLRQ WR ³FLYLO XQLRQV´ are to civil unions 
created in New Zealand and in the five other specified jurisdictions  -  unless 
the context otherwise requires.86  There are a number of different contexts in 
                                                                                                                             
consent to a de facto relationship if either party is under 18: Care of Children Act 2004, s 46A 
(as inserted by s 3 of the Care of Children Amendment Act 2005). 
82 Status of Children Act 1969, s 5. 
83 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 182. 
84 Wills Act 2007, s 18. 
85 Family Proceedings Act 1980, ss 63-69. 
86 Civil Union Act 2004, s 5. 
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which the issue of the recognition of an overseas registered same-sex 
relationship might arise.  Some of these contexts might not even engage the 
civil union legislation at all. 
 
B. Overseas Same-sex Marriages 
Two Canadian couples, one opposite-sex and one same-sex, validly marry in 
that country.  Were they to move to the United Kingdom, the opposite-sex 
couple would be regarded as still married; the same-sex couple would be 
UHJDUGHG DV LQ D FLYLO SDUWQHUVKLS GXH WR WKH H[SUHVV UXOH LQ WKH 8.¶V &LYLO
Partnership Act 200487 that overseas same-sex relationships are converted 
into civil partnerships.  Were they to move to New York, a state with neither 
same-sex marriage nor civil union in its own domestic law, both couples 
(including the same-sex couple) would be regarded as married.88  Were these 
couples to move instead to New Zealand, the UK approach could not be 
followed EHFDXVH³FLYLOXQLRQ´LQ1HZ=HDODQGOHJLVODWLRQGRHVQRWLQFOXGHany 
relationships at all from Canada.  But might the New York approach be 
adopted instead, so that the Canadian same-sex couple are regarded by New 
Zealand law as being married, in exactly the same way as the opposite-sex 
couple are? 
 
The Civil Union Act 2004, while addressing (if restrictively) the issue of 
overseas civil unions, ignores completely the question of overseas same-sex 
marriage.  The question has never directly arisen whether the normal rules for 
recognising overseas marriages would apply to marriages contracted in 
countries that permit same-sex marriages, like Canada, South Africa, Spain, 
Norway, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the US states of 
Massachusetts and Connecticut.  Clearly, opposite-sex marriages from these 
jurisdictions will continue to be recognised, for the New Zealand courts are 
                                            
87 Section 215 and Sched 20. 
88 In Martinez v County of Monroe 850 NYS 2d 740 (NY 2008), the New York Court of 
Appeals held that a marriage validly contracted in Canada between two women was to be 
treated as a marriage in New York because it satisfied the normal marriage recognition rule 
DQGZDVQRWSURKLELWHGE\DQ\³'HIHQFHRI0DUULDJH$FW´LQ1HZ<RUN$ORZHUFRXUWIROORZHG
this decision when it refused to dismiss a divorce action on the ground that a Canadian 
marriage between a same-sex couple was void in New York: Beth R v Donna M 853 NYS 2d 
501 (NY 2008). 
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highly unlikely to hold that the whole concept of ³PDUULDJH´LQWKHVHFRXQWULHV
has been rendered so alien by their opening to same-sex couples as to be 
unrecognisable as marriage in New Zealand.89  The real question is whether a 
marriage involving a same-sex couple contracted in any of these countries is 
to be treated any differently from one involving an opposite-sex couple. 
 
There is no explicit prohibition in New Zealand law90 on the recognition of 
overseas same-sex marriages, though some will doubtless argue that same-
sex marriages are not, in reality, ³PDUULDJHs´at all for the purposes of New 
Zealand private international law.  The Court of Appeal decision in Quilter v 
Attorney-General91 might be called in aid, as might the fact that the passing of 
the Civil Union Act 2004 confirmed that New Zealand law sees marriage as an 
institution limited to opposite-sex couples.  This is the definitional argument 
which is often raised by opponents to same-sex relationship recognition: 
marriage by definition is an opposite-sex relationship and so it is an 
intellectual impossibility to include same-sex relationships within that term.92  
But Quilter is not decisive here since, focussing very much on the meaning of 
the Marriage Act 1955, it is clearly limited to the restrictions on marriage in 
New Zealand domestic law and does not purport to give a universalist 
definition of marriage.  And in so far as Keith J and Thomas J explored the 
international position, this 1998 decision, finding that no country in the world 
accepted same-sex marriage, was very shortly overtaken by events.  The flaw 
in the definitional argument in the international context is its underlying 
assumption that marriage has a natural, unchanging and universally 
understood meaning.  But it does not.  Marriage is an artificial construct 
                                            
89 Effectively, the argument in Hyde v Hyde that a marriage regime that permitted polygamy 
ZDVQRW³PDUULDJH´DVXQGHUVWRRGE\WKHFRXUWVRI&KULVWHQGRP, even when the individual 
marriage before the court was not itself polygamous. 
90 As there is, for example, in a majority of US states.  Australia is one of the few non-US 
FRXQWULHVZLWKDVLPLODU³Defence of MDUULDJH$FW´The Marriage Amendment Act 2004, No 
126 2004 (CthDPHQGHG$XVWUDOLD¶V0DUULDJH$FWWRGHILQHPDUULDJHDVDXQLRQ
between one man and one woman and s 88AE of the 1961 Act now provides that unions 
solemnised in a foreign country between same-sex couples must not be recognised as 
marriage in Australia.  For a discussion, see Lindell, n 51 above.  $SULYDWHPHPEHU¶VELOOWR
similar effect was debated in the New Zealand Parliament in 2005, but the Marriage (Gender 
Clarification) Amendment Bill was defeated at first reading (New Zealand House of 
Representatives, Hansard 7th December 2005, p 677). 
91 [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
92 For a persuasive UHEXWWDORIWKHGHILQLWLRQDODUJXPHQWVHH7KRPDV-¶VMXGJPHQWLQQuilter. 
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created and defined by each legal system and it has proved both flexible and 
diverse throughout its history.  The law in any domestic legal system is free to 
define marriage to include relationships of more than two people, to be limited 
to relationships that cannot be escaped from at all during life or which can 
simply be repudiated without judicial process, and to include relationships 
between both opposite-sex and same-sex couples.  Indeed, for at least one 
SXUSRVH 1HZ =HDODQG GRPHVWLF ODZ DOUHDG\ GHILQHV ³PDUULDJH´ WR LQFOXGH
same-sex relationships.93  But domestic definitions do not govern private 
international law, which is a means by which the courts can apply other than 
domestic definitions.  New Zealand domestic law defines marriage as a 
monogamous relationship,94 but at the same time accepts that other countries 
have a wider definition and will treat as married (at least for some purposes) a 
person from a country that permits polygamy, even when that person has 
more than one wife, or is sharing her husband with another wife.  And so too 
with marriage between same-sex couples.  The fact that New Zealand defines 
marriage differently from Canada (for example), by limiting it to opposite-sex 
couples, does not mean that New Zealand must assert that the relationship 
validly created in CanadaGHILQHG WKHUHDV³PDUULDJH´ LVnot a marriage for 
the purposes of internal New Zealand legislation.  The definitional argument 
does not work to prevent the application of the normal marriage rule to 
overseas same-sex marriages. 
 
Nor can it be argued today that recognition of an overseas same-sex 
marriage needs to be denied by the New Zealand courts on the basis of public 
policy.  While it has long been accepted that the domestic court has the power 
to refuse to recognise any foreign marriage on this basis, the marriage would 
have to be so objectionable to New Zealand sensitivities that it would be 
unconscionable for the courts to give effect to it.  This argument might have 
some purchase in jurisdictions that explicitly withhold recognition of same-sex 
relationships in their domestic law and seek, by constitutional amendment, to 
                                            
93 Section 7A of the Family ProFHHGLQJV$FWGHILQHV³PDUULDJH´WRLQFOXGHD³FLYLOXQLRQ´
and a relationship where the parties have been living together as husband and wife, this for 
WKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH)DPLO\&RXUW¶VSRZHUWRUHIHUWKHFRXSOHWRFRXQVHOOLQJXQGHUVRIWKDW
Act. 
94 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 31(1)(a)(i). 
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protect themselves from the evils they see embodied in foreign same-sex 
relationships, but it simply does not work in a country like New Zealand, which 
has extended most of the same legal rights and liabilities to its own gay and 
lesbian citizens as to its heterosexual majority, and which has introduced a 
means of regulating same-sex relationships to virtually the same extent as it 
regulates opposite-sex relationships.  The public policy exception is designed 
to exclude repugnant foreign rules, not different foreign rules and the fact that 
New Zealand rejected the option of adapting its marriage rules to 
accommodate same-sex couples means nothing more than that it has chosen 
a different route to gay and lesbian equality from that chosen by Spain, by the 
Netherlands, by Belgium, by Norway, by Sweden, by South Africa and by 
Canada.95  These are countries whose legal systems, and political and social 
outlooks, are so similar to New Zealand¶V that they too have been able to 
accommodate the needs of their gay and lesbian citizens for equality before 
the law.  That accommodation has been achieved by utilising a different form 
of personal relationship from that in New Zealand, but it is simply not plausible 
to say that it is a repugnant form. 
 
So there is no good reason not to apply the normal marriage rule to 
overseas marriages involving same-sex couples.  To the contrary, there are a 
number of good reasons why that normal rule ought indeed to be applied to 
such marriages.  For one thing, it would remove any differential treatment 
based on sexual orientation, and so would further, rather than compromise, 
an important legal principle contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990.  Marriages involving same-sex couples would then be recognised, or 
not, on the same basis as marriages involving opposite-sex couples, and 
domestic legal rules would consequentially be applied also without 
discrimination.  Imagine, for example, that a same-sex married couple from a 
country ZLWKDORZHUDJHRIPDUULDJHWKDQ1HZ=HDODQG¶VKRQH\PRRQVLQ1HZ
Zealand, the parties being then aged eighteen and fifteen; at the same time a 
twenty-six year old Nigerian man brings both his thirteen year old wives to 
                                            
95 The New York Court of Appeals in Martinez v County of Monroe (n 88 above) rejected out 
of hand the argument that it was contrary to New York policy to recognise a Canadian same-
sex marriage.  A fortiori in New Zealand which, unlike New York, has an institutionalised 
means of recognising same-sex relationships in its own domestic law. 
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New Zealand.  The Nigerian is exempt from criminal liability for underage 
sex96 because his marriage, though polygamous and underage, is opposite-
sex and ex hypothesi recognised as valid.97  But the eighteen year old would 
be equally exempt only if VKHZHUH³PDUULHG´WRWKHfifteen year old within the 
terms of section 134(4) of the Crimes Act 1961.  Nowhere in that Act is the 
ZRUG³PDUULHG´GHILQHGIt is difficult to identify any social utility in criminalising 
the gay sex while exempting the straight sex and if none exists then any 
differential treatment is discriminatory: this would be avoided simply by 
holding that ³PDUULHG´, within the terms of the 1961 Act, refers to marriages 
valid where they are contracted rather than valid according to New Zealand 
domestic law.  Since it is this definition that saves the validity of polygamous 
marriages, adopting the same definition for same-sex marriages is clearly not 
beyond the interpretative power of the courts.98 
  
Another reason for applying the normal marriage rule to overseas 
marriages involving same-sex couples is that some at least of the effects of 
such marriages will unavoidably be felt in New Zealand, creating 
unacceptable anomalies if other effects are denied.  For example, a married 
couple from South Africa will lose by their marriage, according to the law of 
their South African domicile, their ability to contract a subsequent 
marriage/civil union EHFDXVH D SHUVRQ¶V FDSDFLW\ WR FRQWUDFW D QHZ
marriage/civil union in New Zealand is a question properly referred to the law 
of the domicile.  As such, the incapacity exists whether the couple are 
opposite-sex or same-sex.  It follows that, when section 31(1)(a)(i) of the 
Family Proceedings Act 1980 says that a marriage is void if either party is 
already ³married´, and section 8 of the Civil Union Act 2004 says that a 
person who is ³married´ is prohibited from entering into a civil union,99 
³PDUULHG´ LQ ERWK SURYLVLRQV UHIHUV QRW WR PDUULDJHV YDOLG according to New 
Zealand domestic law EXWWRPDUULDJHVYDOLGLQWKHODZRIWKHSDUW\¶VGRPLFLOH.  
This result is inevitable  -  even without deploying a discrimination-based 
                                            
96 Crimes Act 1961, s 134(4). 
97 Mohamed v Knott [1969] QB 1. 
98 Of course another route to non-discrimination would be to repeal s 134(4) of the Crimes Act 
for married couples.  This, arguably, would serve a contemporary social policy (child 
protection) far better than a rule that targeted gay sex. 
99 Except with his or her spouse under the provisions of s 18 of the 2004 Act. 
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argument.  Of course, domicile can change but it does not always follow that 
status changes too.  If the South African couple subsequently change their 
domicile to New Zealand they wouOGFOHDUO\VWLOOEHUHJDUGHGDV³PDUULHG´IRU
these purposes if they were opposite-sex (by application of the normal rule for 
recognition of overseas marriages).  Every policy that underpins the very idea 
of private international law  -  comity between nations, promotion of certainty, 
giving effect to reasonable expectations, avoiding limping relationships  -  
screams out for the same result if the couple were same-sex.  This is 
achieved by interpreting ³PDUULHG´ WR LQFOXGH DOO FRXSOHV ZKRse marriages 
were valid by the law of their domiciles at the time of the marriage.  Again, this 
result is not dependent on a discrimination argument but is based rather on 
the general principles of private international law as applied to the process of 
statutory interpretation.  To include same-sex married couples in the definition 
RI³PDUULHG´LQVection 31 of the 1980 Act and section 8 of the 2004 Act would 
be consistent with the clear aim of these provisions which is, surely, to ensure 
that marriages and civil unions contracted in New Zealand are both legally 
and socially monogamous.  It would also be consistent with the approach to 
polygamous marriages, which imposes marital incapacity even in countries 
where a polygamous union could not be contracted,100 and it would avoid the 
very problem that the private international law of marriage is primarily 
designed to prevent  -  limping relationships. 
 
For these reasons, it is submitted that an overseas marriage between 
parties of the same sex, which cannot be treated as a civil union in New 
Zealand, should be treated as a marriage for the purposes of New Zealand 
domestic law, on condition only that it satisfies the normal private international 
law rules for recognition of marriage.  The number of countries from which 
same-sex relationships might be recognised in New Zealand would be more 
than doubled, at no cost to any legal principle or social policy.  If this solution 
is politically unbearable to the New Zealand Parliament, as being incompatible 
with its approach to same-sex marriage in domestic law, then it can step in 
                                            
100 Baindail v Baindail [1946] P 122. 
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and adopt the UK approach of converting overseas marriages involving same-
sex couples into civil unions. 
 
C. Overseas Opposite-Sex Civil Unions 
Two Dutch couples, both opposite-sex, register their relationship in the 
Netherlands, one as a civil union and the other as a marriage.  The 
consequences of these relationships are, in the Netherlands, virtually the 
same.  Had they been New Zealanders registering their relationship in New 
Zealand, their choices would have been the same as those available in the 
Netherlands, and the consequences the same too.  But only the couple who 
chose marriage are guaranteed to have their relationship given full effect in 
New Zealand, for the couple who chose civil union might not be treated as 
civil union partners in New Zealand because of the omission of the 
Netherlands from the 2005 Regulations.  But to treat the opposite-sex civil 
union couple as, at best, a de facto couple is to treat them differently from, 
and less well than, the married couple in circumstances in which, had they 
registered in New Zealand, they would have been treated the same.  Only an 
accident of geography, and excessive formalism based on no reason of social 
or legal policy, results in their being treated less well than New Zealand 
couples in exactly the same situation. 
 
Other than New Zealand, civil unions are available to opposite-sex 
couples in South Africa and the Netherlands, though neither of these 
relationships is of a type specified in the 2005 Regulations for inclusion within 
the definition of ³FLYLO XQLRQ´ IRU WKH SXUSRVHV RI 1HZ =HDODQG OHJLVODWLRQ.101  
But, especially in the international context, names matter less than the 
essence of the relationship.  If, for all intents and purposes, such relationships 
are identical to marriages in New Zealand then it might be argued that the 
marriage rule for recognition applies in this situation too because, whether or 
not the relationship happens to be called marriage, its essence is so similar 
that the common law rule applicable to marriage is the only one appropriately 
                                            
101 The only specified jurisdiction to allow opposite-sex couples access to civil union is New 
Jersey, but there the institution is restricted to opposite-sex couples who are aged 62 or 
above. 
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applied to such overseas relationships.  But what is it to be recognised as?  If 
section 5 of the Civil Union Act 2004 prevents it being recognised as a civil 
union for the purposes of New Zealand legislation, the only option would 
appear to be to treat any overseas opposite-sex civil union as a marriage for 
the purposes of legislation that governs marriage/civil union in New Zealand.  
This would allow, for example, the statutory presumption of parenthood102 to 
apply  -  as it should, for otherwise the male partner in a state-registered 
relationship would be deprived of the presumption of paternity of any child 
born to the female partner, notwithstanding that the presumption is not a 
benefit of marriage but a recognition of the reality that parties to a stable 
heterosexual relationship can be assumed to indulge in procreative sexual 
activity.103  To oblige the male partner in an opposite-sex civil union to prove 
his paternity is to impose an unnecessary burden on him for no benefit and 
potential cost both to his wallet and (more importantly) to his relationship with 
the child.  This can be avoided simply E\LQWHUSUHWLQJ³PDUULDJH´LQVection 5 of 
the Status of Children Act 1969 to include all registered relationships that 
have all the core characteristics of marriage, whatever name they go under in 
the jurisdiction in which they were created. 
 
There is nothing conceptually inept in this approach.  If English law 
(admittedly with statutory authority) can treat as a civil union a relationship 
structured as, and called, marriage in another country, then there is no 
doctrine of law to prevent New Zealand treating (judicially) as a marriage a 
relationship that is called something else in another country.104  There is 
indeed some authority for such an approach.  In Lee v. Lau105 a marriage was 
held to be potentially polygamous because, by its local law, the husband was 
entitled to take concubines.  Now, concubinage as such was not recognised in 
any form and so it was treated by English law as a form of marriage, on a par 
                                            
102 Status of Children Act 1969, s 5(1). 
103 The same anomaly arises in New Zealand domestic law which, though it permits opposite-
sex civil union, has no presumption of parenthood flowing from that relationship. 
104 The New Zealand Law Commission (above, n 8 at para 28) rather nicely quotes Lord 
THPSOHPDQ¶Vtart comment in Street v Mountford >@$&DW³WKHPDQXIDFWXUHRID
four-pronged implement for manual digging results in a fork even if the manufacturer, 
unfamiliar with the English language, insists that he intended to make and has made a 
VSDGH´ 
105 [1967] P 14. 
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ZLWK PDUULDJH ZLWK WKH ³SULPDU\ ZLIH´ QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKDW LW ZRXOG QRW EH
treated DV RU FDOOHG ³PDUULDJH´ by the local law.  Following this, the New 
Zealand courts might be persuaded to regard as a marriage a union entered 
into by a South African opposite-sex couple who had chosen ³FLYLO
SDUWQHUVKLS´Ds the form of their UHODWLRQVKLSDVRSSRVHGWR³PDUULDJH´,106 on 
the basis that it has all the attributes (except the name) of marriage  -  
including, crucially, the gender mix required for marriage in New Zealand  -  
and it satisfies the normal recognition rule for marriage.  But while 
conceptually this approach is possible, politically it is unacceptable because,  
at heart, it amounts to nothing more than an assertion that state-sanctioned 
relationships between opposite-sex couples are, by definition, marriage  -  
with the dangerous implication that state-sanctioned relationships between 
same-sex couples are, by definition, not marriage.  For that reason, we 
probably have to reject the idea that an overseas opposite-sex registered 
relationship is, for purposes of New Zealand legislation, a marriage, however 
attractive the results of this approach may be. 
 
The reality, of course, is that an overseas relationship registered as a 
FLYLO XQLRQ LV VLPSO\ D FLYLO XQLRQ  1HZ =HDODQG OHJLVODWLRQ GHILQHV ³FLYLO
XQLRQ´ WR H[FOXGH UHODWLRQVKLSV IURP DOO foreign jurisdictions except the five 
specified in the 2005 Regulations, but this definition applies only ³if the 
context does not otherwise require´.  It is submitted that the context will 
usually require otherwise, just as it does for same-sex civil unions, to which 
we will now turn for illustrative examples. 
 
D. Overseas Same-Sex Civil Unions 
Two Danish couples, one opposite-sex and one same-sex, register their 
relationship in Denmark: neither has a choice of form and the opposite-sex 
couple are obliged to marry while the same-sex couple are obliged to register 
a civil union.  Both couples come to New Zealand.  The opposite-sex couple 
will have their relationship recognised (or not) by application of the normal 
                                            
106 6RXWK$IULFD¶V&LYLO8QLRQ$FWDGRSWVWKHLQWHUHVWLQJDSSURDFKRIXVLQJWKHSKUDVH
³FLYLOXQLRQ´DVDQRYHUDUFKLQJFRQFHSWZLWKLQZKLFKSDUWLHVRIZKDWHYHUJHQGHUPL[ZKR
wish to register their relationship with the state can choose one of two forms: civil partnership 
or marriage. 
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private international law rules applicable to marriage.  The same-sex couple 
will not have their relationship recognised under the 2004 Act because 
Denmark is omitted from the 2005 Regulations.  But some effects of  that civil 
union will be felt in New Zealand whether or not it is formally recognised under 
the 2004 Act. 
 
For one thing, as we have already seen in relation to overseas 
marriages, neither party to the Danish civil union will be able to enter a 
marriage/civil union in New Zealand while he or she retains an Danish 
domicile.  An effect of the civil union is recognised even if the union itself is 
not.  Indeed, the Danish civil union might prevent recognition of another civil 
union that would otherwise be recognised under the 2004 Act.  If the Danish 
couple separate but do not divorce, and one of the two then purports to enter 
a civil union in Finland, the effect of the extant Danish civil union will be felt in 
New Zealand at least to the extent that it invalidates the Finnish civil union, 
even when the Danish union itself is denied formal recognition.  Another 
unavoidable effect of an overseas civil union relates to wills.  If, say, 
Switzerland follows the New Zealand rule107 that a marriage/civil union 
revokes any prior will and a Swiss couple register a civil union there, New 
=HDODQG ODZ VLPSO\ KDV QR LQWHUHVW LQ FRQIXVLQJ D GHFHDVHG¶V VXFFHVVLRQ, 
even to property located in New Zealand, by distributing that person¶VHVWDWH
according to a will that both systems would consider revoked in the purely 
domestic context.  Succession to moveables is normally governed by the law 
RIWKHGHFHDVHG¶VGRPLFLOHDQGWRLPPRYHDEOHVE\WKH lex situs.  Yet to hold 
that immoveables in New Zealand are to be governed by a will that the law of 
the domicile (Switzerland, in this case) considers revoked is to fall into the 
trap of confusing ongoing effects of the status of marriage/civil union (such as 
the obligation of maintenance, or the grounds of divorce, which can come and 
go with changes in domicile) and the one-off effects of attaining the status 
(such as the revocation of a will).  A will once revoked by the system 
SRWHQWLDOO\ JRYHUQLQJ D SHUVRQ¶V VXFFHVVLRQ DW WKH GDWH RI UHYRFDtion is not 
UHYLYHGE\DFKDQJH LQ WKDWSHUVRQ¶VGRPLFLOH even to a country that would 
                                            
107 Wills Act 2007, s 18. 
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not have revoked the will  -  and a fortiori to a country like New Zealand that 
would. 
 
Now, once it is accepted that some of the effects of overseas civil 
unions will be recognised in New Zealand beyond the terms of the Civil Union 
Act 2004 it becomes in principle highly anomalous to refuse to grant full 
recognition to overseas civil unions other than those from the countries listed 
in the 2005 Regulations.  If the existence of such anomaly is not sufficient to 
SHUVXDGHWKHFRXUWWKDWWKHFRQWH[WUHTXLUHVDZLGHUGHILQLWLRQRI³FLYLOXQLRQ´
in section 5 of the 2004 Act  -  which, remember, itself envisages a wider 
definition if the context requires  -  then deploying a discrimination-based 
argument should, it is submitted, do so.  Since most countries in the world that 
have civil union regimes limit these regimes to same-sex couples while 
maintaining marriage as an opposite-sex relationship, the two types of couple 
will normally be treated differently, depending on the gender mix of their 
relationship, that is to say depending upon their sexual orientation.  And the 
opposite-sex couple are often treated preferentially.  For example, if a 
marriage is recognised from Denmark but a civil union is not, then the parties 
in the opposite-sex relationship could seek in New Zealand to enforce the 
obligation of maintenance during the relationship,108 while the same-sex 
couple could do so only after the relationship has come to an end;109 the 
parties in the opposite-sex relationship will be able to seek full financial 
settlement on separation, however long their relationship had lasted110 while 
the parties to a same-sex relationship will have lesser rights if their 
relationship has lasted less than three years;111 orders relating to settled 
property may be sought by the opposite-sex couple but not the same-sex 
couple.112  These are clear disadvantages for the same-sex couple (or at least 
the economically less secure of the two).  If it can be shown that this different 
treatment is contrary to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 then the way 
                                            
108 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 63. 
109 Ibid, s 64. 
110 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 11-13. 
111 Ibid, ss14-14A. 
112 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 182. 
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is open to extend section 5 beyond the jurisdictions listed in the 2005 
Regulations. 
 
 There is little scope for re-interpreting section 5 itself.  The problem 
would evaporate if we could interpret the words: ³DUHIHUHQFHWRDFLYLOXQLRQ
[in New Zealand legislation] refers to [civil unions from New Zealand and the 
ILYHRWKHUMXULVGLFWLRQV@´to mean ³FLYLOXQLRQ includes´FLYLOXQLRQVIURPWKRVH
jurisdictions.  This would remove the discrimination but it is probably unlikely 
that the New Zealand courts will feel able to do so under s 6 of the 1990 Act.  
More likely the courts will hold that this is stretching the meaning of the phrase 
beyond breaking point and so would be usurping the function of Parliament. 
 
But using section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to influence 
the interpretation of individual statutory provisions might be more productive.  
This has already happened with the rule in section 3(2) of the Adoption Act 
1955 WKDWDMRLQWDGRSWLRQRUGHUFDQEHPDGHRQO\LQIDYRXURIWZR³VSRXVHV´
In In the Matter of C113 -XGJH :DOVK XVHG WKH %LOO RI 5LJKWV¶ SURKLELWLRQ RI
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ RQ WKH EDVLV RI PDULWDO VWDWXV WR KROG WKDW ³VSRXVH´ FRXOG
incOXGHFRXSOHVZKRDUHLQDUHODWLRQVKLS³LQWKHQDWXUHRIPDUULDJH´114  The 
Bill of Rights equally contains a prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
VH[XDORULHQWDWLRQDQG³VSRXVH´PD\ZHOO IRUH[DFWO\ WKHUHDVRQVH[SUHVVHG
by Judge Walsh, also include same-VH[FRXSOHVLQUHODWLRQVKLSV³LQWKHQDWXUH
RIPDUULDJH´-  wherever in the world their relationship had been registered. 
 
Of course, most family law statutes talk not of spouse but of parties to 
a marriage/civil union.  An example is provided by the statutory obligation of 
maintenance.115  This can be enforced during the relationship only by parties 
to a marriage/civil union and that terminology would seem to exclude 
registered same-sex couples (but not registered opposite-sex couples) from a 
large number of countries.  But that exclusion applies, according to section 5 
of the Civil Union Act 2004, only when the context does not otherwise require.  
                                            
113 [2008] NZFLR 141. 
114 Ibid, paras 41-46, 74 and 77. 
115 Family Proceedings Act 1980, ss 63 and 64. 
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If the adoption of a wider definition avoids a discriminatory application of a 
particular rule, then it is submitted that the context requires such a wider 
definition.  To withhold title to seek an order under section 63 of the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980 from same-sex couples from Denmark while at the time 
allowing such title to opposite-sex couples from Denmark (because their 
marriages are recognised) is a discriminatory application of the rules in the 
1980 Act, for the achievement of no social or legal policy objective.  ³&ivil 
XQLRQ´ LQWKLVFRQWH[WRXJKW therefore to be interpreted to include civil unions 
valid in the country of their creation.  This result is allowed by section 5 of the 
Civil Union Act, which in its own terms envisages a wider interpretation, and is 
mandated by section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which requires a 
non-discriminatory interpretation.  Other examples of this approach are given 
below. 
 
E. Divorce and Dissolution 
One of the defining characteristics of marriage/civil union, and that which most 
clearly distances it from domestic partnership regimes and de facto 
relationships, is that a judicial or other legal process requires to be gone 
through to bring the relationship to an end before death.  Two questions arise 
in relation to same-sex couples with an international element to their 
registered relationship: access to the New Zealand courts to terminate 
relationships created overseas, and recognition in New Zealand of divorces 
and dissolutions granted by courts overseas. 
  
1. Access to Divorce and Dissolution in New Zealand 
A Norwegian same-sex couple register their relationship there and then 
permanently move to New Zealand; the Norwegian courts eventually lose 
jurisdiction to dissolve that union.  The relationship breaks down and the 
parties seek to divorce under the Family Proceedings Act 1980, in order to 
allow one to return to Norway, free to contract a new marriage/civil union 
there.116  If the parties had married, there is no problem in them seeking a 
                                            
116 The Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 37, allows the New Zealand Family Court to hear an 
application for an order dissolving a marriage or civil union, if at least one of the parties is 
domiciled in New Zealand. 
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divorce in the normal way (if the argument above relating to same-sex 
marriage is accepted).  However, the New Zealand Family Court would 
appear at first sight to have no jurisdiction to dissolve the relationship if it is a 
civil union, because ³FLYLOXQLRQ´DVGHILQHGLQVection 5 of the 2004 Act does 
not include civil unions from Norway.  Must the Family Court send the parties 
away empty handed, as Lord Penzance did to the applicant for divorce in 
Hyde v Hyde?  The party will not be able to marry again in Norway (or any 
other country that recognises the Norwegian union) because of his existing 
relationship and it is harsh indeed to deny him the right to go to the court of 
his domicile for dissolution.  The problem was resolved in an innovative 
manner in Salucco v Alldredge117 where the Superior Court of Massachusetts 
was asked to grant a divorce to parties who had entered a civil union in 
Vermont.  The court held that divorce was available only to married couples, 
which did not include couples in an out of state civil union,118 but that in the 
exercise of a general equitable jurisdiction the civil union could be dissolved 
on the same grounds as marriage would be.  New Zealand courts do not have 
such a general equitable jurisdiction, but the considerations would be the 
same: the parties are in a relationship that will prevent them remarrying or 
entering a new civil union; jurisdiction to terminate the existing relationship 
has been lost by the courts of its creation; some, at least, of the effects of the 
relationship  -  including marital incapacity  -  are felt in what is now the 
SDUWLHV¶GRPLFLOH to apply the limited definition oI ³FLYLOXQLRQ´ LQVection 5 to 
that phrase as it appears in the dissolution provisions of the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980 would result in jurisdiction being accepted or rejected 
by the New Zealand court for either purely formalistic reasons (whether the 
relationship takes the form of marriage or civil union) or (in respect of 
relationships from countries that permit same-sex couples only civil union) for 
discriminatory reasons.  These considerations suggest that the context in 
which the question arises  -  the application of New Zealand divorce and 
dissolution legislation to relationships created overseas  -  requires that ³FLYLO
XQLRQ´EHLQWHUSUHWed to include all civil unions that create marital incapacity in 
                                            
117 17 Mass L Rep 498 (2004). 
118 Shortly after this decision, however, Massachusetts opened its marriage (and divorce) 
laws to its own same-sex couples and the decision might well be different today. 
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New Zealand.  For reasons already discussed this means all civil unions valid 
in the country where they were entered into.  Norwegian civil union partners 
can divorce in New Zealand. 
 
2. Recognition of Overseas Divorces and Dissolutions 
Section 44 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 governs the recognition of 
overseas orders for divorce or dissolution or nullity of marriage/civil union.  
Again, the question is whether overseas relationships are encompassed 
ZLWKLQ WKH WHUP ³PDUULDJH´DQG ³FLYLOXQLRQ´ LQ WKLVFRQWH[W  The grounds for 
recognition under section 44(1) are basically jurisdictional and the rules are 
decidedly directive and leave little room for any judicial discretion to refuse 
recognition of overseas divorces or dissolutions.  Recognising an order 
dissolving a civil union from, say, Sweden depends on the meaning of ³FLYLO
XQLRQ´ in section 44(1).  That section contains in its own terms no limitations 
on the jurisdictions from which dissolutions entitled to recognition come, and 
indeed is worded deliberately widely  -  it talks of disVROXWLRQE\DFRXUW³RIDQ\
country outside New Zealand´  -  and it is suggested, therefore, that here, 
perhaps more than anywhere else, the context requires WKDW WKHZRUGV ³FLYLO
XQLRQ´ DV WKH\ DSSHDU LQ Vection 44(1) be interpreted more widely than the 
limited list in the 2005 Regulations, effectively to include valid civil unions from 
any country that has a civil union regime.  Since the Swedish relationship 
itself  -  like it or not  -  has inevitable effects in New Zealand (as shown 
above) a refusal to recognise its dissolution would result in New Zealand 
giving effect to at least some elements of a relationship it really does not want 
to recognise, even although that relationship no longer exists (and so no 
longer has these effects) in the country of its creation.  This really would be a 
legal system cutting off its own jurisprudential nose to spite itself.  The context 
of divorce and dissolution requires another result: a Swedish dissolution of a 
civil union can be recognised under s 44(1) if the jurisdictional requirements 
specified there are satisfied. 
 
In any case, sHFWLRQ  VWDWHV WKDW ³QRWKLQJ LQ WKLV VHFWLRQ VKDOO
DIIHFWWKHYDOLGLW\RIDGHFUHHRURUGHU«IRUGLYRUFHRUGLVVROXWLRQRIPDUULDJH
RU FLYLO XQLRQ « WKDW ZRXOG EH UHFRJQLVHG E\ WKH courts of New Zealand 
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RWKHUZLVH WKDQ E\ YLUWXH RI WKLV VHFWLRQ´  In other words, section 44(1) 
provides grounds for recognising overseas decrees in addition to the existing 
common law grounds.  There is nothing to prevent the New Zealand courts 
from recognising GHFUHHVHYHQLIWKH\DUHQRWVWULFWO\GHFUHHVGLVVROYLQJ³FLYLO
XQLRQV´DVGHILQHG LQVection 5 of the 2004 Act, by developing common law 
rules for recognition.  It would be no surprise, and juridically convenient, if the 
rules they developed mirrored more or less exactly the statutory rules in 
section 44(1) of the 1980 Act, or at least the common law rules that applied 
before 1980.119 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The fundamental flaws LQ WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ SURYLVLRQV RI 1HZ =HDODQG¶V &LYLO
Union Act 2004 have already been identified: the focus on legal systems 
rather than the relationships created within these legal systems, the reliance 
on ministerial discretion, the conflating of the recognition rule with the 
GHILQLWLRQRI³FLYLOXQLRQ´and the discrimination inherent in making same-sex 
relationship recognition so much more difficult than opposite-sex relationship 
recognition.  The end-result is a scheme for recognition of overseas 
relationships that is both insular and heterocentric.  The arguments presented 
here for escaping that insularity are by no means guaranteed to work.  
Without amending legislation, same-sex couples from overseas will face 
potentially decades of uncertainty as to their status in New Zealand, and so 
amending legislation is the only certain way for New Zealand to avoid the 
charge of mean-spirited xenophobia  -  perhaps even homophobia.  The 
DPHQGPHQWQHHGQRWEHFRPSOH[ 7KHZRUGV ³UHIHUV WR´ LQVection 5 of the 
$FWFRXOGEHUHSODFHGZLWKWKHZRUG³LQFOXGHV´OHDYLQJLWWRWKHFRXUWVWR 
                                            
119 In Hassan v Hassan >@1=)/56RPHUV-VDLGDWS³,GRQRWWKLQNLWFDQEH
in doubt but that a purported divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties [or one of them], will 
be recognised in New Zealand: see Armitage v Attorney General >@3´  ButterworWK¶V
Family Law in New Zealand (13th edn 2007) at para 11.114 suggests that s 44(2) allows the 
New Zealand courts to develop an additional ground for recognising overseas divorces based 
RQWKH³UHDODQGVXEVWDQWLDOFRQQHFWLRQ´WHVWODLGGRZQE\WKH+RXVHRf Lords in the English 
case of Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33.  This would also be a suitable test for overseas 
dissolutions of civil union. 
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work out which other civil unions than those specified in the 2005 Regulations 
should also be recognised.  Or section 5 could be amended to refer to 
individual relationships (as opposed to jurisdictions) that do not offend the 
core New Zealand values listed in section 35(2)  -  rendering the making of 
Regulations redundant but retaining Parliamentary control over which 
relationships are entitled to recognition.  There are probably other means of 
achieving this end, but it is suggested that some such amendment is required 
urgently in order to remove not only the great potential for highly disruptive 
uncertainty and complexity in family life but also the distinctly unwelcome face 
that New Zealand currently presents to gay and lesbian people from 
overseas. 
